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UTAH UTAH SUPREME COURT 
DOCUMENT 
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45.9 
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Glenn C. Hanni, #A1327 
David R. Nielson, #6010 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SANDRA BEYNON, 
) DEFENDANTS FIRST CITATION OF 
) SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITIES 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ) 
vs. ) 
) Case No. 91-0551 
ST. GEORGE - DIXIE LODGE ) Priority No. 16 
# 1743, BENEVOLENT & ) 
PROTECTIVE ORDER OF ELKS, ) 
Defendant/Appellee. ) 
Defendant St. George - Dixie Lodge # 1743, Benevolent & 
Protective Order of Elks, through counsel, hereby provides the 
Court with the following citations to supplemental authorities 
both pertinent and significant to this case. Defendant/Appellee 
submits these citations pursuant to Rule 24(j) of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. The reasons for the supplemental 
citations are also set forth, as required by rule. 
nrsHJBJ 
DEC 2 1992 
CLERK SUPREME COURT, 
UTAH 
000045*40 
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SUPPLEMENTAL CITATIONS 
Defendant has recently discovered the existence of three 
cases addressing the issues presented on this appeal: 
A. Maine Human Rights Comm'n. v. Le Club Calumet, 
The first supplemental citation offered by defendant is 
Maine Human Rights Comm'n. v. Le Club Calumet, 609 A.2d 285 (Me. 
1992). The decision of the Supreme Court of Maine in Le Club 
Calumet is significant to this case for a number of reasons: 
1. In Le Club Calumet, the Maine Supreme Court held that 
the state's Human Rights Act did not prohibit Le Club Calumet 
from limiting its membership practices to males only. This 
supports the argument made by defendant in Point I of its brief 
(pp. 11-33) that the male-only membership practices of the Elks 
Lodge are not prohibited under the Utah Civil Rights Act. 
2. In Le Club Calumet the court found it significant that 
the defendant was "a fraternal organization with the primary 
purpose of propagating the french language. . . . " Id. at 286. 
The court further found it significant that the general public 
could not attend the club's private meetings, even though the 
public could attend other public social functions held by the 
club. These facts are similar to the facts asserted on pages 3-8 
of defendant's brief, wherein it is shown that the Elks Lodge is 
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also a fraternal organization that has as its central activity a 
weekly membership meeting that can only be attended by members of 
the lodge. 
3. In Le Club Calumet the court held that Le Club Calumet 
did not fit within the scope of the Human Rights Act because it 
was not a "place of public accommodation." A place of "public 
accommodation" was defined by the statutes of Maine as "any 
establishment which in fact caters to, or offers its goods, 
facilities or services to, or solicits or accepts patronage from, 
the general public." jDd. (emphasis added). The Supreme Court 
held that Le Club Calumet did npt satisfy this definition. Le 
Club Calumetf s holding directly supports the argument made in 
Point I of defendant's brief that defendant is not a "business 
establishment" within the meaning of the Utah Civil Rights Act. 
4. In Le Club Calumet the court found it significant that 
there was "no evidence that club membership [was] essential to 
the maintenance of social or business opportunities in the . . . 
community." 3^ d. at 287. This fact is pertinent to the instant 
case because the statement of facts contained in appellant's 
brief similarly fail to allege that the admission practices of 
the Elks Lodge have had any adverse consequence on plaintiff's 
business dealings. 
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B. Welsh v. Boy Scouts of America. 
The second supplemental citation offered by defendant is 
Welsh v. Boy Scouts of America, 787 F. Supp. 1511 (N.D. 111. 
1992). This case is significant to the instant case for a number 
of reasons: 
1. Welsh held that the Boy Scouts of America organization 
does not fall within the scope of the Federal Civil Rights Act. 
The court explained that the Act only applies to "places of 
public accommodation" and concluded that the Boy Scouts is not a 
"place." In so holding, the court stated that the term "place" 
was not simply a term of convenience, but rather was intended to 
limit the scope of the Civil Rights Act. The court further 
stated that "place" should be given its customary meaning. Id. 
at 1530, 1534, 1537-39. These observations are analogous to the 
points made in pages 22-25 of defendant's brief, wherein 
defendant argues that the Elks Lodge is not included within the 
scope of the Utah Civil Rights Act because it is not a 
"business." As in Welsh, plaintiff has argued that the term 
"business" is simply a term of convenience that adds nothing to 
the Act, while defendant has argued that "business" limits the 
scope of the Act and must be interpreted according to its 
ordinary meaning. Welsh suggests that "business" is in fact a 
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limitation on the scope of the Utah Civil Rights Act, as argued 
in pages 22-25 of defendant's brief. 
2. In Welsh the court set forth 63 paragraphs of facts. 
Id. at 1514-21. All of the facts set forth were considered to be 
relevant to a determination of whether an entity falls within the 
scope of a civil rights act. Id. at 1514 N.2. These facts are 
pertinent to the instant case because they are very similar to 
the statements of fact found in pages 3-8 of defendant's brief. 
3. Welsh was held to be distinguishable from two key cases 
relied upon by plaintiff throughout her various briefs: Curran 
v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of America, 195 Cal. 
Rpt. 325 (1983), and United States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 
764 (Minn. 1981). See Welsh, 787 F. Supp. at 1530. 
4. Welsh refused to follow United States Power Squadron's 
v. State Human Rights Appeal Bd, 452 N.E.2d 1199 (N.Y. 1983), a 
case relied upon by plaintiff on pages 16-17 of her second reply 
brief. Id. 
C. United States Jaycees v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n. 
The third supplemental citation offered by defendant is 
United states Jaycees v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n., 427 N.W.2d 
450 (Iowa 1988) (en banc). Jaycees is pertinent and significant 
to this case for a number of reasons: 
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1. Jaycees declined to follow United States Jaycees v. 
McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764, 768-69 (Minn. 1981), a case relied upon 
by plaintiff on page 11 of her second reply brief- Id. at 453. 
2. Jaycees was held to be distinguishable from two key 
cases relied upon by plaintiff throughout her various briefs: 
Board of Directors of Rotary Intfl v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 
U.S. 537 (1987), and Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 486 U.S. 
609 (1984). See Jaycees, 427 N.W.2d at 453. 
3. Jaycees held that the Iowa Civil Rights Act did not 
prohibit the Jaycees organization from denying membership to 
females because the Act only applied to "places of public 
accommodation." "Public accommodation" was defined very broadly 
to include "every place, establishment, or facility of whatever 
kind, nature, or class that caters or offers services, 
facilities, or goods to the general public. . . . " Id. at 452 
(emphasis added). The Iowa Supreme Court held that the Jaycees 
was not a "place" or an "establishment" under this definition. 
Id. at 454. These holdings are synonymous with Point I of 
defendant's brief, which similarly asserts that the Elks Lodge is 
not included within the scope of the Utah Civil Rights Act 
because it is not a "business establishment." 
4. Jaycees held that "place" and "establishment," as used 
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in the Civil Rights Act, should be given their ordinary and 
customary meanings. This supports the argument made by defendant 
on pages 22-25 of its brief that the term "business" should be 
given its ordinary meaning when interpreting the Utah Civil 
Rights Act. 
As demonstrated, the three supplemental authorities cited 
above are pertinent and significant to a resolution of this case. 
Defendant therefore urges this court to consider these additional 
authorities prior to ruling on plaintifffs appeal. 
DATED this rJ -~ day of December, 1992. 
»-*v^ ; 
STRONG & HAN! 
.enn T. Hanni 
David R. Nielson 
Attorneys for Defendant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this r)\^ day of December, 1992, 
I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, by placing 
such in the United States mail, first class postage prepaid, and 
addressed to: 
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Utah Legal Clinic 
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